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Press Release · European Central Bank

Christine Lagarde: Acting in time

Distributed by Finance Private · Originally issued via European Central Bank

Keynote speech by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at the 36th Frankfurt European Banking Congress

Frankfurt am Main, 20 November 2026

It is a pleasure to be back at this congress. This is the eighth time I have spoken here as President of the ECB, and it will sadly be the last.

In preparing for today, I reread those speeches. The topics have varied, from growth and inflation to capital markets and the Single Market.

But one concern runs through all of them: how to make Europe stronger, so that its prosperity is driven by its own strengths and less exposed to decisions taken elsewhere.

For many years, the challenges we discussed here were old ones. We had fallen short of our ambitions for the Single Market. Our growth relied too heavily on external demand for an economy of our size, and our competitiveness was slowly eroding.

Those challenges have not gone away. But in recent years, new ones have been layered on top. Dependencies that we once saw as a normal part of an open economy, from critical raw materials to technology, can now be used against us. That has made economic sovereignty a challenge in its own right.

The old challenges and the new ones have something in common.

Five centuries ago, Machiavelli compared the problems of states to a fever that, at the start, is “easy to cure but difficult to detect” and, in time, becomes “easy to detect but difficult to cure”.

Both kinds of challenge are of this sort. By the time everyone can see the need to act, the best time to act has usually passed.

Acting early, before the case is obvious, is one of the hardest things a policymaker has to do. It means paying a price up front for a distant pay-off. And if nothing goes wrong, those who acted can easily appear to have paid that price for nothing.

Today I would like to reflect on how Europe can still act early, drawing on how we have approached this at the ECB and on what I have learned along the way.

Why Europe acts in some crises but not others

It is often said that Europe only moves in a crisis. Jean Monnet wrote that Europe would be forged in crises, and would be the sum of the solutions adopted for them. The idea was that Europe has a kind of in-built inertia that only a crisis can overcome.

My experience of the past seven years is that this is only partly true. Europe responds decisively to some crises and hesitantly to others.

When events convince us that the world has changed, we act. During my term, I have watched Europe break one taboo after another.

Before the pandemic, few believed that the EU would ever borrow on a large scale in its own name. But once we accepted that no country could recover on its own, we created a recovery fund financed by common debt to the tune of €800 billion.

Europe was also said to be unable to take its own security seriously. Yet when Germany concluded that it would have to take on more of its own defence, it made the biggest change to its defence spending in generations. At the European level, we also agreed on Security Action for Europe (SAFE), which offers up to €150 billion in loans for joint defence procurement. And after decades of neutrality, Finland and Sweden joined NATO.

Nor did many expect Europe to act as a geopolitical power. Yet it is now Ukraine’s largest supporter. And when it became clear that Europe would have to bear more of the cost, the countries ready to act found a new way to borrow together on Ukraine’s behalf, even though not every country was ready to take part. Hence the coalition of the willing.

What made these steps possible? In each case, the cost of inaction was there for all to see, and it was plainly greater than the cost of acting. Once we were convinced of that, our institutions did not hold us back.

Our difficulties arise when a crisis moves slowly. The cost of inaction is then just as real, but it is far less visible. It builds up a little each year, and no single moment forces a decision. Meanwhile, the cost of acting is certain and has to be paid straight away.

Both the old challenges and the new ones are of this kind.

Take capital markets. We have all agreed for more than a decade that Europe needs a capital markets union. But building it means taking on vested interests now, for gains that arrive years later.

Each year without it, more of our savings are invested abroad and more of our growing firms look elsewhere for funding. Yet no single year’s loss is large enough to overcome the resistance to change.

We have seen this again in recent weeks. The Council has just agreed its position on strengthening the supervision of capital markets, which is welcome. But the position weakens the European supervisor’s ability to take effective decisions and includes too many carve-outs.

Our dependencies raise the same problem. Reducing them means paying for new capacity now, against a threat that may never materialise. One recent estimate suggests that raising Europe’s share of the world’s AI computing capacity from around 5% to 15% by 2030 would require investment of around €1.3 trillion.[1]

But as long as we can buy computing power from foreign providers and frontier AI models remain available to us, the case for paying that price is hard to make.

In both, the cost of inaction is real, whether it is a loss we are already suffering or a danger we may face tomorrow. But it rarely becomes visible enough to build the broad consensus for change that we found for the pandemic or for Ukraine.

This is the central problem of European policymaking. We can see the problem early, but we can act only once it has become impossible to ignore. And by then, almost by definition, it is too late. Lost industries are very hard to win back, and once a dependency has been used against us, our sovereignty is already exposed.

Think of the euro area debt crisis. The scale of Greece’s difficulties was clear long before Europe acted decisively to strengthen its institutions. We paid a much higher price than if we had acted earlier, including a six-quarter recession.

We often hear that policymakers in Europe do not understand the problems they face. I think they do. The difficulty is that they are asked to impose visible costs on their citizens today, for benefits that will only become apparent over time, before a majority is convinced that action is needed.

These are among the hardest decisions in public life, and I have a great deal of sympathy for those who have to take them.

At the ECB, we have had to take some of them too.

Acting early at the ECB

Economic sovereignty is not an objective in itself for us. Our primary objective is price stability, and the Treaty also gives us the tasks of issuing money and promoting the smooth operation of payment systems. But a changing world bears directly on those tasks, and during my term it has confronted us with slow-moving risks of our own.

We have faced decisions of this kind in three areas. In each, we had to choose whether to invest early in something whose value would only become clear later.

The first area was retail payments.

Since the euro was introduced, Europeans have had a single means of payment that works everywhere in the euro area: euro cash. But for card payments, we have relied on providers from outside Europe. International card schemes handle more than 60% of our card payments, and 14 of the 21 euro area countries have no domestic scheme at all.[2]

For a long time, this did not seem to matter, because cash was still the dominant means of payment. The international schemes worked well, and no one had ever cut Europe off.

The private sector tried more than once to build a European alternative, but each attempt ran into the same vicious circle: merchants will not adopt a scheme that few customers use, and customers will not use one that few merchants accept.

But cash is playing a smaller role as more of our spending moves online, where more than a third of our day-to-day spending now takes place.[3] And the geopolitical climate has changed. We have already seen judges of the International Criminal Court living in Europe, some of them European citizens, lose the use of their bank cards overnight.

So we concluded that Europe needed a digital equivalent of cash: the digital euro.

It will give Europeans a means of payment that runs on European infrastructure. And as legal tender, it will have to be accepted throughout the euro area wherever digital payments are possible, which will break the vicious circle in a way that private initiatives could not. Private payment providers will then have open rails on which to compete.

Because a project of this scale takes years to build, we had to start well before the need became pressing. If the legislation is adopted by the end of this year, we aim to be ready for a first issuance in 2029.

The second area was wholesale markets.

With blockchain technology, securities can now be tokenised, so that they are issued, traded and settled on a single platform. With the right framework, tokenisation offers a chance to build a genuine single market in digital assets, integrated from the start. For Europe, that is a huge opportunity.

But the window for seizing it is limited. The market for tokenised assets is still small, worth around €23 billion worldwide in March, but it was five times its size a year earlier.[4] As it grows, its standards and practices will take shape.

If they develop separately, the market could split into platforms that follow different rules and cannot settle with one another. And as our capital markets have taught us, once standards and practices have diverged, they are very hard to bring back together.

That is why, in September, we launched Pontes, which allows tokenised transactions to settle in central bank money on Eurosystem infrastructure, under European rules. Every platform now has access to a common settlement asset, so liquidity no longer has to be divided between them. Earlier this month, the European Stability Mechanism settled a €1 billion digitally native bond on Pontes.

Through Appia, we are working with market participants towards an integrated European market, including common standards. But infrastructure alone is not enough. Common rules will be needed too, and those lie with legislators.

The third area was the international role of the euro.

For most of its history, the ECB took a neutral view of the euro’s international role. Shortly before my term began, it moved to a more supportive line, and during my term we have acted on it. A stronger international role for the euro matters for our monetary policy, and it can support Europe’s growth and sovereignty in the world we now face.

Europe faces large investment needs, from defence to the technologies on which our autonomy depends, and a currency that investors around the world want to hold lowers the cost of financing them. In a world of more frequent shocks, the more of our trade is invoiced in euro, the less exposed we are to swings in exchange rates.

So, where it supports our own mandate, we have made the euro easier to use abroad.

We are linking TIPS, our instant payment system, with fast payment systems in other regions. We have also strengthened our international liquidity lines as a backstop. In February we made EUREP, our repo facility for central banks, permanent and open to central banks worldwide. More than 30 central banks have already expressed interest. And we are working to keep our swap lines fit for purpose in a more fragmented world. They will be more accessible, too.

The primary objective of these lines is to protect the transmission of our monetary policy in a crisis, by limiting spillovers from abroad into our own markets. But they also support the euro’s global role. A reserve manager who knows that euro securities can be turned into euro liquidity without a fire sale has more reason to hold them in normal times.

What lessons can we draw?

In our own field, we have tried to act on slow-moving risks early, before they were fully visible. I would draw three lessons from this experience.

The first is that it is far easier to take the long view with a European mandate.

I should be frank about our own case. If we were able to commit early, it was largely because of how we are built. Our mandate is defined for the euro area as a whole. Our horizon is long, and the Governing Council can decide by majority.

That made our decisions easier than those facing national governments, which have to weigh concentrated opposition at home against benefits that are spread across Europe, while reaching agreement with partners who face the same constraints.

But this is no reason for fatalism. It tells us something important about how Europe needs to be built. Where we agree that a challenge requires a European solution, we should strengthen the European institutions that can provide it, so that this trade-off weighs less heavily.

In capital markets, that means a European supervisor able to take effective decisions. In technology, where projects such as chip plants and data centres need European scale, it means public-private partnerships at European level, with public money, including from the EU budget, taking the first losses and drawing in private capital.

The second lesson is that we should design our response, wherever we can, so that it pays off even if the worst never happens. That makes it easier to build support for acting early, because we no longer need to agree on how likely the danger is.

The digital euro is an example. Even if Europe is never cut off from the international card schemes, it will still be better placed, because we have designed the digital euro on open standards that allow any provider to offer services across the whole euro area.

The same principle can guide other choices that require large commitments.

Take defence. EU countries spent around €420 billion on defence last year, a fifth more than the year before, and are set to spend over €450 billion this year,[5] at a time when budgets are stretched and many other priorities compete for the same resources.

But if more of that money is spent on research and development, it can benefit the whole economy, whatever the security outlook. Today, we spend ten times less on defence R&D than the United States, relative to the size of our economy.[6] Recent ECB analysis suggests that, over the long term, each additional euro of public R&D spending can generate almost 2.5 euros of GDP.[7]

Not every choice can be designed this way. Some protection is simply insurance, and we should be honest that it has a price. But the more of our response we can design to pay off in every future, the easier it becomes to act in time.

The third lesson is more personal.

I have faced these decisions throughout my career as a policymaker, at national, European and international level. However carefully we design our choices, some uncertainty always remains, and someone has to take responsibility for deciding.

The hardest judgement is to recognise when waiting has become the riskier choice, before the evidence is beyond doubt. At that point, leaders have to find the courage to make the case for acting, before a majority is ready to hear it.

And those who act early must be prepared to go without thanks. As Henry Kissinger observed, “it is in the nature of successful policies that posterity forgets how easily things might have been otherwise.”

So we should do everything we can to make acting early easier, by doing more at European level and by designing policies that pay off whatever the future holds. But we will also need leaders who believe in Europe and are prepared to fight for it.

Conclusion

Let me conclude.

Over these seven years, I have seen Europe do things that were once thought impossible, when events had made the way ahead clear. The question now is whether it can act with the same resolve before the need becomes impossible to ignore.

At the ECB, we have tried to do that in our own field. Whether we judged well, others will decide in time. But I hope I leave an institution that has helped give Europe more integration and more sovereignty than it had when I arrived.

Much of what remains lies with others, and with those who will lead Europe in the years ahead. I am confident that they will find the conviction to act in time.

Thank you.